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THE CONTINUED NEED FOR THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: 
EXAMINING SECOND-GENERATION DISCRIMINATION 
JENIGH J. GARRETT* 
We have a way in America of wanting to be ‘rid’ of problems.  It is not so 
much a desire to reach the best and largest solution as it is to clean the board 
and start a new game . . . . [To] not want to solve it, [to] not want to 
understand it, [to] want simply to be done with it and hear the last of it.  [This 
is the worst] of all possible attitudes . . . .1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 dramatically changed America’s political 
process.  Racial diversity in Congress has substantially increased and the 
country elected the first Black President of the United States in 2008.  
According to some, President Obama’s election provides convincing evidence 
that America is now in a post-racial political era.  With discrimination in the 
area of voting a thing of the past, the argument goes, Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act—which requires federal review of voting changes in certain 
jurisdictions before they an become law—is an antiquated remedy to a 
nonexistent problem.2 
The 2006 reauthorization of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, however, 
revealed that “a bleaker side of the picture . . . exists” despite the success of the 
Voting Rights Act.3  In over 16,000 pages of evidence supporting the 
reauthorization of Section 5, Congress learned that minorities in Section 5-
covered jurisdictions continue to face voting hurdles enacted with either a 
discriminatory intent or effect.  When the congressional record in support of 
 
* Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (“LDF”).  It has been an 
honor to serve as an attorney at LDF and pursue a more inclusive democracy.  I would like to 
thank my colleagues at LDF for their inspiration and commitment.  I especially want to thank 
Ryan P. Haygood for his substantive suggestions and comments to this article and Debo 
Adegbile, who offered suggestions and shared resources supporting the research of this article.  I 
also want to thank Lawrence D. Bobo and Samuel Spital, for their formal and informal comments 
and suggestions. 
 1. W.E.B. DuBois, The Color Line Belts the World, COLLIER’S: THE NAT’L WKLY, Oct. 
20, 1906, at 30. 
 2. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2525 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
 3. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180 (1980). 
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the 2006 reauthorization closed, the evidence and testimony showed that 
Section 5 continues to be not only the heart of the Voting Rights Act, but one 
of the most effective measures to prevent discrimination in voting. 
Notwithstanding the actual evidence of discrimination in the 2006 
reauthorization record, the argument that America is post-racial and, therefore, 
post-Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was one aspect of Appellant’s opening 
Supreme Court brief in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number 
One v. Holder (hereinafter “NAMUDNO”),4 the first constitutional challenge to 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act after its 2006 reauthorization.  Plaintiff 
argued, among other things, that the election of President Obama was evidence 
that discrimination is a thing of the past and the evidence of discrimination in 
the 2006 Voting Rights Act reauthorization record did not support 
congressional reauthorization.5 
NAMUDNO boldly placed Congress’s ability to function within its express 
constitutional authority before the Court and anticipated that the Court would 
overturn the 2006 reauthorization. 
In an 8-1 opinion, however, the Supreme Court avoided the constitutional 
question by ruling that a political sub-unit could seek exemption from the 
requirements of Section 5 under the Act’s bailout provisions.6  The ruling was 
a victory for the Act.  But dicta in both the majority and dissenting opinions 
reiterated constitutional concerns articulated by those who opposed the 2006 
reauthorization of the Act.7 
With little in the opinion preventing future constitutional challenges, 
covered jurisdictions quickly responded.  A little over a year after the Court 
issued its ruling three separate jurisdictions (Alabama, Georgia, and North 
Carolina) filed cases challenging Section 5’s constitutionality.  These cases 
have relied on some of the same assumptions and arguments raised in 
NAMUDNO: the evidence of second-generation discrimination in the 2006 
record of reauthorization—voting barriers that do not bar minorities from the 
political process in a wholesale way but prevents the full participation of 
minorities in the political process—cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
The 2006 congressional record in support of reauthorization, however, 
evidenced the opposite.  Section 5 has worked against voting discrimination, 
including second-generation barriers, in covered jurisdictions since the 1982 
reauthorization.  Over the course of more than ten hearings Congress analyzed 
and reviewed evidence of discrimination in voting from 1982-2006.  The 
evidence and testimony in support of reauthorization revealed that 
 
 4. See Appellant’s Brief at 1–13, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 
08-322). 
 5. See id. at 1. 
 6. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2513, 2516–17. 
 7. Id. at 2512, 2525. 
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notwithstanding the success of some minority candidates from covered 
jurisdictions, second-generation barriers continue to prevent the full promise of 
the Voting Rights Act and Section 5 continues to be the most effective 
preventative measure against racial discrimination in voting.8 
This article challenges the assertion that second-generation discrimination 
does not evidence the continued need for Section 5.  Part II examines the 
mechanics of the Voting Rights Act and Section 5 in particular.  Part III 
examines how second-generation barriers harm minorities.  Part IV reviews 
examples of persistent second-generation discriminatory barriers in the 2006 
reauthorization record and previous reauthorization records.  Part V concludes 
that Congress was within its authority when it determined that second-
generation barriers continued to persistently harm minority voters in Section 5 
covered jurisdictions. 
II.  THE MECHANICS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
The Voting Rights Act is complex legislation with interacting measures for 
combating discrimination against minority voters.9  The Section 5 preclearance 
requirement is a tailored remedy designed to address the persistent nature of 
voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions.  Section 5 requires all or part of 
sixteen states to submit all proposed changes to any voting practice or 
procedure to the United States Attorney General or the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia for preclearance before the voting change 
can become law: 
Whenever a State or political subdivision . . . shall enact or seek to administer 
any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or 
procedure with respect to voting . . . such State or subdivision may institute an 
action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a 
declaratory judgment that such qualification . . . neither has the purpose nor 
will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race 
or color . . . [or] . . . such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice or 
procedure may be enforced without such [court] proceeding if the . . . 
procedure has been submitted . . . to the Attorney General and the Attorney 
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such 
submission . . . .10 
 
 8. Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 
§ 2(b)(2), 120 Stat. 577. 
 9. Among other things, the Act bans literacy tests in covered jurisdictions, prohibits 
discrimination that has the intent or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote nationwide, 
authorized federal examiners to conduct voter registration, and authorizes the Attorney General to 
assign persons who may be federal officers to observe how elections are conducted and report 
their observations to the Attorney General of the United States.  Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1973(a)-(b), 1973a(b), 1973b, 1973e (repealed June 27, 2006), 1973f  (2006). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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The language of the Act is flexible and applies to a broad range of 
discriminatory mechanisms.11  The Act is not concerned with a “simple 
inventory of voting procedures but the reality of changed practices as they 
affect Black voters” in subtle and obvious ways.12 
III.  UNDERSTANDING HOW SECOND-GENERATION DISCRIMINATORY 
BARRIERS HARM MINORITY VOTERS 
Section 5 applies to both first and second-generation barriers.  First-
generation barriers are discriminatory stratagems that result in the wholesale 
exclusion of minorities from the political process.13  Second-generation 
barriers, on the other hand, allow formal access to the franchise but dilute 
minority voting strength by limiting the effect that minority votes could have 
on the political process.14  Second-generation discriminatory barriers are often 
more sophisticated than the facially discriminatory mechanisms that preceded 
them.15  Nonetheless, the minority voting experience in covered jurisdictions 
 
 11. The Act reaches a wide range of laws that can subvert the effect of the Voting Rights Act 
in covered jurisdictions.  Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969).  The actions 
of the Mississippi legislature provide one example of how states were determined to control the 
impact of federal laws regulating voting as a direct reaction to the registration requirements of the 
Voting Rights Act.  See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 21 (1968).  
In 1966, one year after the Act’s enactment, the Mississippi legislature introduced approximately 
30 bills relating to elections or the political process in regular and special sessions of the 
Mississippi legislature.  Id. at 22.  One statute approved by the legislature allowed voters to 
decide, by petition, if members of county boards of education would be elected at-large when the 
1965 practice was the election of countywide representatives from five districts.  Id.  Another 
statute provided that members of the county governing body, which were elected from five single 
member districts, could exercise a local option and elect members of the county governing body 
at large.  Id.  Most sponsors of the bill were from counties where the majority population of at 
least one district, or the entire county, was Black.  Id.; see also Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d 222, 
227–31 (5th Cir. 1962) (discussing the subversion of federal voting laws before Section 5’s 
enactment). 
 12. See Allen, 393 U.S. at 565; Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388 (1971); Georgia v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531 (1973). 
 13. RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS 3 (2004); see also Pamela S. 
Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution 
Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 18384 (1989). 
 14. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of 
Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1093 (1991) (“[F]irst generation [barriers are] 
direct impediments to electoral participation [and include] registration and voting barriers.  Once 
[first generation] obstacles were surmounted . . . the focus shifted to second-generation, indirect 
structural barriers such as at large, vote-diluting elections.”). 
 15. See Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 
523, 55253 (1973).  In addition, testimony before Congress during the 1970 reauthorization 
showed that jurisdictions quickly adopted second-generation barriers once the Voting Rights Act 
became law.  See Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearing on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538 Before 
Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 255 (1970) (statement of Clarence 
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shows how both the wholesale exclusion of voters and second-generation 
barriers achieve the same discriminatory result.16 
A. Second Generation Barriers Prevent Minorities from Electing Their 
Candidates of Choice 
Secondary barriers are discriminatory because minorities are unable to 
recognize their voting strength even though they are allowed formal access to 
the political process.17  What constitutes a second-generation barrier is broad18 
 
Mitchell, Wash. Ass’n of the NAACP) (“Immediately after passage of the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act the Mississippi Legislature . . . passed twelve bills and resolutions which substantially altered 
the state’s election laws.  Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina have all resorted to 
various devices to slow down [or] prevent registration, voting and election to public office.  
These devices include abolishing offices, switching to so-called ‘at large elections,’ consolidation 
of counties, ‘full slate voting,’ barring or intimidating poll watchers and giving misleading 
information to would-be voters.”). 
 16. The wholesale nature of first-generation discrimination creates an absolute barrier to 
formal participation at the first stage of the political process.  See Karlan, supra note 13, at 
18384.  Until the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, first-generation barriers were successfully 
used to bar minority access to the political process, notwithstanding the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 
1960, and 1964.  Voting Rights Act: Hearing on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
89th Cong. 14 (1965) (statement of Stanley Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“In 
almost any other field, once the basic law is enacted by Congress and its constitutionality is 
upheld, those subject to it, accept it.  In this field, however, the battle must be fought again and 
again in county after county.”).  When the Voting Rights Act outlawed first-generation 
discriminatory barriers to registration by requiring the registration of voters under federal law, 
second-generation barriers were enacted in response.  See Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearing 
on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538, supra note 15, at 194 (statement of Vernon Jordan, Director, Voter 
Education Project, Southern Regional Council to the National Liberties Clearinghouse) 
(describing voting changes related to residency requirements, registration deadlines, hours for 
registration, and the location of places for registration); id. at 255 (statement of Clarence Mitchell, 
Wash. Ass’n of the NAACP) (noting in 1967, the Virginia State Conference of the NAACP did a 
statewide check regarding registration conditions.  They found that “[i]nsufficient time to register 
and inconvenience of the place of registration were the most common complaints.  In Lancaster 
County it was necessary to make an appointment to register.  In Southampton County registration 
was on Thursdays only.  In Halifax County the registration dates were set at the ‘convenience of 
the registrar.’”  In another county, a registrar left to go play golf).  Second-generation barriers 
continued to hinder the registration of minority voters between 1982 and 2006.  See, e.g., Voting 
Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 299–301 (2006) (Baldwin 
County, AL) (purge and reidentification of voters); id. at 712–715 (State of Georgia) (reduction 
of the minimum number of permanent satellite voter registration locations to be established by 
certain counties and the elimination of satellite registration during 18 months of the state’s two 
year election cycle); id. at 1599–1605 (State of Mississippi) (administrative plan for 
implementation of National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA)). 
 17. See Derfner, supra note 15, at 524, 55357 (listing examples of second-generation 
barriers); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The 
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 183839 (1992). 
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and includes straightforward barriers, like moving a polling place,19 to the 
complex manipulation of district lines.  Whether straightforward or complex, 
however, second-generation barriers can “render the abstract right to vote 
meaningless” because the elective structure that should allow for fair 
participation in the political process prevents it.20 
During previous reauthorizations, Congress received evidence and 
testimony revealing that both blatant and subtly effective discriminatory 
mechanisms impacted the minority voting experience in covered jurisdictions.  
Changes impacting the adoption or application of aggregate voting structures, 
for instance, became one of the most frequently used second-generation 
responses to the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.21  Aggregate voting 
structures allow populations to collectively exercise their political power and 
determine the outcome of an election.22  Several second-generation barriers, 
however, serve to limit the collective impact of the choices minority voters 
make at the voting booth when aggregating their votes.  These barriers include 
the creation of discriminatory electoral districts,23 adopting a majority vote 
requirement when elections are held at-large,24 annexations,25 and anti-single 
shot voting laws.26 
 
 18. Even changes concerning the eligibility of candidates and ministerial acts such as 
changes to election schedules and filing periods can prevent minorities from electing a candidate 
of choice in a discriminatory manner.  See Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 364 (1969); NAACP 
v. Hampton Cnty. Election Comm’n, 470 U.S. 166, 174–181 (1985); see also WASHINGTON 
RESEARCH PROJECT, THE SHAMEFUL BLIGHT: THE SURVIVAL OF DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IN 
THE SOUTH 140 (1972).  In 1966, only one year after the enactment of Section 5, the Mississippi 
legislature proposed a change that increased the requirements for qualifying as an independent 
candidate.  Id.  Specifically the number of signatures required to qualify for a statewide office 
increased from 1,000 to 10,000.  Id.  When the change was submitted for preclearance the 
Attorney General objected.  Id. 
 19. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387 (1971) (finding that a seemingly innocuous 
change, such as the location of a polling place, can be used to prevent access to the franchise 
notwithstanding the registration of voters because “accessibility, prominence, facilities, and prior 
notice of the polling place’s location” affect a person’s ability to vote on Election Day). 
 20. See id.; STEVEN F. LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER: SOUTHERN BLACKS & ELECTORAL 
POLITICS 1965-1982 at 217 (1985) (finding second-generation barriers render the vote “relatively 
useless, because of the way the rules of the game are rigged . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 21. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. 
L. REV. 1705, 1724 n.83 (1992-1993). 
 22. Id. at 1712–13. 
 23. See Stanley A. Haplin Jr. & Richard L. Engstrom, Racial Gerrymandering and Southern 
State Legislative Redistricting:  Attorney General Determinations Under the Voting Rights Act, 
22 J. PUB. L. 37, 42–49 (1973). 
 24. DAVID HUNTER, FEDERAL REVIEW OF VOTING CHANGES:  HOW TO USE SECTION 5 OF 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 38–39 (1974), reprinted in Extension of the Voting Rights Act: 
Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R. 3427, and H.R. 350 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1510–1511 (1975); see also 
Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional 
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The record evidence of both the use and impact of second-generation 
barriers during the 25 years since the 1982 reauthorization led Congress to 
conclude that racial discrimination in voting continued to prevent the equal 
participation of minorities in the political process in covered jurisdictions.27  
Moreover, the testimony and evidence during the 2006 reauthorization 
revealed that minorities in covered jurisdictions were subject to second-
generation electoral structures that enhanced discrimination against minority 
voters at a higher rate than voters in non-covered jurisdictions.28 
B. The NAMUDNO Dissent Failed to Recognize Second-Generation 
Barriers and How They Obstruct Democracy 
The dissenting opinion in NAMUDNO argued that the evidence of second-
generation discrimination in the 2006 congressional record was insufficient to 
support the reauthorization of Section 5.  According to the dissent, the days of 
grandfather clauses, discriminatory tests, and systematic campaigns to 
disfranchise Blacks “are gone.”29  Covered jurisdictions, the dissent continued, 
do not make a “concerted effort” to defy the Constitution in an “unremitting 
and ingenious” manner.30  As a result, Section 5 is nothing more than 
“[p]unishment for long past sins . . . [with no] legitimate basis for imposing a 
forward-looking preventative measure that has already served its purpose.”31 
The dissent attacked second-generation barriers directly and argued that 
evidence of “‘second-generation barriers constructed to prevent minority 
 
Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 594 (1982) (statement of Ed Brown, Dist. 
Coordinator for the NAACP, Camilla and Mitchell Cntys., Georgia) (noting Americus, Georgia, 
for instance, changed their voting system for mayoral and council elections from plurality to 
majority vote without submitting the change for preclearance.  The majority vote requirement was 
implemented in the following two elections and used to exclude African Americans from office). 
 25. Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R. 3427, and 
H.R. 350, supra note 24, at 1513–15. 
 26. Id. at 1511. 
 27. The House Committee Report concluded that “voting changes devised by covered 
jurisdictions resemble those techniques and methods used in 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1982 
including: enacting discriminatory appointed positions; relocating polling places; enacting 
discriminatory annexations and deannexations; setting numbered posts; and changing elections 
from single member district to at-large voting and implementing majority vote requirements.”  
H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 36 (2006). 
 28. To Examine the Impact and Effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 974 (2005); see 
also Ellen Katz, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act Since 1982: Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, 39 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 643, 655–56 (2006). 
 29. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2525 (2009) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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voters from fully participating in the electoral process . . . [was] not probative 
of the type of purposeful discrimination that prompted Congress to enact §5 in 
1965 . . . [,] and is not a problem unique to the South.”32 
Of importance is how the dissent redefines second-generation barriers as 
racially polarized voting, Section 5 enforcement actions (which are filed when 
covered jurisdictions fail to submit a voting change for preclearance), federal 
examiner and observer coverage, and lawsuits filed under §§ 2 and 4 of the 
Voting Rights Act.33  The dissent goes on to state that “such evidence bears no 
resemblance to the record initially supporting Section 5, and is insufficient to 
sustain such an extraordinary remedy.  In sum, evidence of second-generation 
barriers cannot compare to the prevalent and pervasive voting discrimination 
of the 1960s.”34 
This characterization of the congressional records in support of the 
enactment and reauthorizations of the Voting Rights Act, however, does not 
reflect the history of the Voting Rights Act.35  Covered jurisdictions responded 
to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by implementing second-
generation barriers to voting.36  While Congress anticipated the use of new 
measures to curtail minority voting strength after covered jurisdictions were 
required to register voters under federal law, the frequent use of second-
generation discriminatory barriers led to numerous cases and significant 
testimony before Congress of their impact.37  Second-generation barriers were, 
and continue to be, a direct reaction to the promise of the Voting Rights Act.38 
 
 32. Id. at 2526. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See supra notes 15, 16, 18, 24. 
 36. Congress learned that covered jurisdictions barraged their electoral processes with 
measures designed to prevent newly registered Black voters from exercising the natural result of 
their voting strength after the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  The method of 
discrimination took “the form of switching to at-large elections where . . . voting strength is 
concentrated in particular election districts, facilitating the consolidation of . . . counties, and 
redrawing the lines of districts to divide concentrations of [Black] voting strength.”  Voting 
Rights Act Extension: Hearing on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538, supra note 15, at 17 (statement of 
Howard A. Glickstein, Staff Dir., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights). 
 37. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 390 n.8 (1971).  While facially neutral, these 
mechanisms interacted with the history of discrimination in the United States and the race of the 
voter to deny or dilute the right to vote on account of race.  See Derfner, supra note 15, at 523.  
During the 1970 extension one Congressman observed, 
resistance to progress has been more subtle and more effective than I thought possible.  A 
whole arsenal of racist weapons has been perfected.  Boundary lines have been 
gerrymandered, elections have been switched to an at-large basis, counties have been 
consolidated, elective offices have been abolished where Blacks had a chance of winning, 
the appointment process has been substituted for the elective process, election officials 
have withheld the necessary information for voting or running for office, and both 
physical and economic intimidation have been employed.  Section 5 was intended to 
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IV.  THE CONTINUED NEED FOR SECTION 5: EXAMINING CONTINUED SECOND-
GENERATION DISCRIMINATION 
The 2006 Voting Rights Act reauthorization revealed that the work of 
eliminating discrimination in voting remains undone.  This section reviews the 
details of how actions in covered jurisdictions were discriminatory and how, 
over the course of three reauthorizations, second-generation discriminatory 
barriers were consistently used to prevent an equal opportunity for minorities 
to participate in the political process. 
A. Discriminatory Responses to Minority Voting Strength 
When population or registration increases or decreases threaten the racial 
composition of a governmental or political unit, voting changes can be 
designed to limit and control the political impact of those changes in a 
discriminatory manner.  During the previous reauthorizations, Congress 
learned that covered jurisdictions reacted to the registration of Black voters and 
the impact of their voting strength by enacting second-generation 
discriminatory barriers.  When Congress revisited conduct in covered 
jurisdictions in 2006, the evidence and testimony in support of reauthorization 
showed that such discriminatory changes persisted in covered jurisdictions.  
This section provides a sample of the record evidence of second-generation 
barriers amassed during the 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006 reauthorizations of 
Section 5 and highlights how evidence of modified and familiar second-
generation stratagems were boldly implemented and/or repeated. 
 
prevent the use of most of these devices.  But apparently the States rarely obeyed the 
mandate of that section . . . . 
Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearing on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538, supra note 15, at 3–4 
(statement of Rep. William McCulloch). 
 38. See generally U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 19–131; James 
Blacksher, Edward Still, Jon M. Greenbaum, Nick Quinton, Cullen Brown & Royal Dumas, 
Voting Rights in Alabama: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 249 (2008); James 
Thomas Tucker, Rodolfo Espino, Tara Brite, Shannon Conley, Ben Horowitz, Zak Walter & 
Shon Zelman, Voting Rights in Arizona: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 283 (2008); 
Robert A. Kengle, Voting Rights in Georgia: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 367 
(2008); Debo P. Adegbile, Voting Rights in Louisiana: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. 
JUST. 413 (2008); Robert McDuff, The Voting Rights Act and Mississippi: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 475 (2008); Juan Cartagena, Voting Rights in New York City: 1982-2006, 
17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 501 (2008); Anita S. Earls, Emily Wynes & LeeAnne Quatrucci, 
Voting Rights in North Carolina: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 577 (2008); John 
C. Ruoff & Herbert E. Buhl, Voting Rights in South Carolina: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
SOC. JUST. 643 (2008); Nina Perales, Luis Figueroa & Criselda G. Rivas, Voting Rights in Texas: 
1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 713 (2008); Anita S. Earls, Kara Millonzi, Oni 
Seliski & Torrey Dixon, Voting Rights in Virginia: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 
761 (2008). 
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1. Annexations and Cancelled Elections 
The annexation process is one type of second-generation barrier repeatedly 
used to discriminate against minority voters.  During previous reauthorizations, 
Congress learned that covered jurisdictions would circumvent adjacent 
concentrated minority populations in favor of adjacent concentrated White 
populations when annexing areas.39  The selective annexation process would 
impact minority voters on the verge of exercising their political strength 
because White voters would not support the same candidate of choice as Black 
voters.40 
Lake Providence, Louisiana, for example, was “substantially evenly 
divided” along racial lines and elected its governing body at-large in 1972.41  
The Town received annexation requests from two adjacent areas to the town at 
the same time, one with a predominately Black population and one with a 
predominately White population.42  The town annexed the White area but 
rejected the request from the Black area.43  Rejecting the annexation request 
from the Black population had the effect of creating a White majority, which 
could control the outcome of the at-large elections.44  The Attorney General 
objected to the change under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.45 
Another example comes from the Town of McClellanville, South Carolina 
in 1974.  There, town officials told Black residents who resided in a 
concentrated area adjacent to the town that any formal request for annexation 
would be rejected because it would dramatically alter the race of the town.46  
When the request for Section 5 preclearance was submitted to the Attorney 
 
 39. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearing on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538, supra note 
15, at 47 (statement of Howard A. Glickstein, Staff Dir., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights) 
(explaining how annexations and redistricting diluted minority voting strength); see also City of 
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, supra note 24, at 238 (statement of 
James Clyburn, Comm’r, South Carolina Human Affairs Comm’n) (“Counties with a high 
percentage of minority voters are invariably grouped with counties that have a high percentage of 
White voters for purpose of electing our state Senators.  Again, the obvious purpose is to dilute 
the effect of the Black vote.  Fairfield is combined with Richland; Williamsburg and Marion with 
Florence and Horry; Georgetown with Charleston; Dillon with Chesterfield and Marlboro; 
Clarendon with Sumter; Edgefield and Allendale with Aiken and Lexington; and Calhoun and 
Orangeburg with Dorchester.  To add insult to injury, the Senate representatives are elected by 
numbered seats within multi-member/multi-county districts, thereby ensuring the continuation of 
an all-White Senatorial body.”). 
 40. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49–50 (1986). 
 41. Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Att’y Gen., to George F. Fox, Jr. (Dec. 1, 1972). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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General, the town erroneously represented that the adjacent Black population 
did not prefer annexation.47  When the Attorney General learned of the false 
statements in the submission he found that the town denied annexation for a 
racial purpose and objected to the change under Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act.48 
During the 2006 reauthorization Congress learned that these types of 
discriminatory annexation processes continued in covered jurisdictions.49  
Grenada, Mississippi, for instance, drew an objection when it cancelled its 
election and carried out a racially selective annexation policy with the 
“purpose to maintain and strengthen White control of a City on the verge of 
becoming majority Black.”50  Similarly, Augusta, Georgia drew an objection to 
its “annexation policy center[ed] on a racial quota system.”51  Annexations to 
the city required corresponding numbers of Black and White populations to 
“avoid increasing the city’s Black population percentage.”52  Augusta even 
went so far as to conduct door-to-door surveys to identify White residential 
areas for annexation.53 
2. The Abandonment of Electoral Structures that Provide Opportunities 
to Elect Candidates of Choice 
Another way covered jurisdictions responded to foreseeable increases in 
the electoral strength of minority populations was to abandon plans that offered 
more opportunities for minority populations to elect candidates of choice.  In 
many cases, single-member districts provide one way for minorities to elect 
candidates of choice.  Changes from single-member districts to at-large or 
multi-member districts, which can be designed to eliminate opportunities to 
elect candidates of choice, were common in the first few years following 
passage of the Act.54  In 2006, Congress learned that such activity continued. 
 
 47. Letter from David L. Norman, supra note 41. 
 48. See Letter from J. Stanly Pottinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Phillip A. Middleton, 
Attorney (May 6, 1974). 
 49. See Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra 
note 16, at 1781–83, 1915–16, 2505–07 (noting Congress learned jurisdictions continued to 
implement the same types of discriminatory annexations to control the racial demographics of the 
population); id. at 305–06, 319–20. 
 50. Id. at 1606–12. 
 51. Id. at 642. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  The City was also sued under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  See Voting Rights 
Act: Evidence of Continued Need: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1516 n.78 (2006).  When the settlement in the Section 2 
litigation resulted in a new method of election that was nondiscriminatory, the Attorney General 
withdrew his objection.  Id. 
 54. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 21–24; WASHINGTON RESEARCH 
PROJECT, supra note 18, at 109–121; see, e.g., Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Att’y 
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Pointe Coupee Parish, Louisiana, for instance, had ten police jury wards 
with a Black majority population in six of the wards.55  When Blacks were able 
to elect candidates of choice, the ten-ward system created a Black majority on 
the police jury.56  The Parish proposed eliminating one of the single-member 
wards by combining it with two other wards.57  The resulting multi-member 
district, however, did not give minorities an equal opportunity to elect 
candidates of choice and would eliminate the Black majority on the police 
jury.58  The Attorney General objected under Section 5 of the Act.59 
During the 2006 reauthorization Congress learned that the abandonment of 
fairer electoral structures for discriminatory electoral structures also continued.  
The City of Freeport, Texas, for instance, proposed the abandonment of single-
member districts once “Latinos were able to elect candidates of choice” under 
a single-member plan.60  The Attorney General objected under Section 5.61 
The testimony and evidence in support of reauthorization showed that even 
when covered jurisdictions adopted fairer electoral structures only after 
litigation, they would seek to abandon the electoral structure that provided an 
opportunity to elect.  The Haskell Consolidated Independent School District, 
for instance, sought to revert to at-large elections after Section 2 litigation 
required single-member districts.62  The Attorney General objected to the 
change and explained that the race-neutral reason proffered by the district for 
the change was pretextual.63 
 
Gen., to Leonard E. Yokum, District Att’y, (May 14, 1971); Letter from David L. Norman, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., to Leslie Hall, Assistant Att’y Gen. (Mar. 20, 1972).  See also Extension of 
the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, supra 
note 24, at 1779 (statement of Paul Alexander, Acting Gen. Counsel, U.S. Comm’n on Civil 
Rights) (“In one jurisdiction in Alabama the at-large election system for electing members to the 
city commission coupled with majority vote and staggered term requirements reportedly have a 
discriminatory effect on minority voting strength.  The city commission in this jurisdiction is 
composed of three members who are elected at large.  One of the commissioners also serves as 
mayor.  Despite the fact that the jurisdiction at one time had a near majority Black population and 
in 1980 was 33 percent Black, no Black has ever been elected to the city commission.  Between 
1969 and 1978, four Black candidates ran for places on the commission.  All were defeated.  
Currently all three members of the city commission live in the predominantly White north side of 
the city.”). 
 55. Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Samuel C. Cashio, Dist. Att’y 
(Aug. 9, 1971). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra 
note 16, at 2291–92, 2529. 
 61. Id. at 2290. 
 62. Id. at 2513–14. 
 63. Id. at 2513–15. 
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And some covered jurisdictions simply refused to adopt fairer electoral 
structures outright.  This occurred in Cleveland, Mississippi, where the school 
district delayed the adoption of single-member districts and cancelled its 1989 
school board election when a state law required the adoption of single member 
districts.64  When the Cleveland School District finally submitted a single-
member redistricting plan that created five citywide districts, the Attorney 
General precleared the change with the understanding that a special election 
would be scheduled in November 1990 under the single-member plan.65 
Six months later the school district proposed the abandonment of its 
redistricting plan and the suspension of the November 1990 election until the 
1990 Census results were available.66  When the Attorney General objected to 
these new changes the school district attempted to circumvent the objection by 
obtaining a state court order authorizing both the abandonment of the single-
member plan and canceling of the November 1990 school board elections.67  
The school district then asked the Attorney General to reconsider and withdraw 
its objection in light of the state court opinion.68  Instead, the Attorney General 
authorized the filing of a lawsuit to enforce Section 5 and hold a special 
election for school board trustees because the school district chose to obtain a 
state court order, allegedly authorizing the abandonment of the plan, instead of 
implementing the new election method required under state law and precleared 
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.69 
3. Discriminatory Redistricting Plans 
The number of redistricting plans designed to prevent minorities from 
exercising their voting strength is significant.70  The following examples 
merely provide some of the details concerning the nature of discrimination 
when redistricting, another second-generation barrier that manipulates the 
voting strength of minority voting populations, occurs in covered 
jurisdictions.71 
 
 64. Id. at 1395–98. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra 
note 16, at 1395–98. 
 67. Id. at 1405–07. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights, supra note 24, at 238 (statement of James Clyburn, Comm’r, South 
Carolina Human Affairs Comm’n); Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and 
Purpose: Hearing, supra note 16, at 310–12, 327–29, 388–90, 397–99, 972–73, 1414–16, 1935–
37, 1983–85, 2082–84. 
 71. See, e.g., Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights, supra note 24, at 371–75 (statement of Michael Brown, Field Dir. for 
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a. Statewide Legislative Plans 
Over the course of previous reauthorizations Congress reviewed several 
incidents of discrimination through redistricting, another second-generation 
barrier.  In some instances discriminatory statewide plans were repeatedly 
adopted by state legislatures.  The redistricting experience in Alabama 
provides such an example.  Over the course of previous reauthorizations the 
evidence and testimony before Congress revealed that the Alabama legislature 
failed to redistrict without discrimination after the 1970 Census despite a court 
order.72  When a federal court was required to intervene, the state submitted 
three plans but all of them had population deviations above 24 percent and 
employed multi-member districts.73  The District Court rejected the proposed 
plans and created a plan with single-member districts.74 
In 1980, Alabama had the second opportunity to draw its districts without 
discrimination.  The redistricting plan created by the legislature, however, 
reduced the Black population in ten urban districts and eliminated four Black 
majority districts in rural counties, which significantly altered minority voting 
strength.75  The Attorney General found that the actions of the state legislature 
were unnecessary to satisfy “any legitimate governmental interest.”76  The 
Attorney General objected to the 1980 redistricting plan.77 
In 1990, the Alabama legislature had the opportunity to draw its 
congressional districts without discrimination.  Nonetheless, when the state 
submitted its congressional redistricting plan for preclearance, the Attorney 
General had reason to believe that the plan was created with the 
“predisposition on the part of the state political leadership to limit Black voting 
potential to a single district.”78  As a result, the Attorney General objected to 
the 1990 congressional redistricting plan.79 
Over the course of several reauthorizations, the evidence and testimony 
before Congress showed that Alabama did not stand alone in creating statewide 
redistricting plans that discriminated against minorities.80 
 
Branches, Va. State Conference of NAACP) (explaining how redistricting harmed minority 
voters in Virginia). 
 72. See Sims v. Amos, 336 F. Supp. 924, 931–32 (M.D. Ala. 1972). 
 73. Id. at 933–34. 
 74. Id. at 934–39. 
 75. Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra 
note 16, at 264–66. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 266. 
 78. Id. at 385–87. 
 79. Id. at 266. 
 80. Statewide redistricting plans from Louisiana, for instance, incurred an objection shortly 
after adoption of the Act.  One of the first occurred in 1971, when the state created a district 
where Blacks were packed together until their population reached 91.2 percent of the district.  
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b. Local Redistricting Plans 
Local governments did not fare much better than states when creating 
redistricting plans over the course of Voting Rights Act coverage.  Less than 
ten years after the Voting Rights Act was enacted, the redistricting plan for the 
City of Many, Louisiana packed the Black population into a single majority-
minority district with a 100 percent Black population.81  The remaining Black 
population was divided among several districts so they were unable to elect a 
candidate of choice.82  Both cracking—the process of fracturing minorities 
across several districts—and packing—the process of concentrating minorities 
in a single district—are second-generation barriers.83  The Attorney General 
interposed an objection and the City of Many had to create a new redistricting 
plan.84 
In 2006, the evidence and testimony before Congress revealed that local 
covered jurisdictions continued to redistrict in a discriminatory manner.  The 
City of McDonough, for instance, submitted a redistricting plan that 
impermissibly packed Black voters, who constituted over 70 percent of the 
population in an otherwise compact geographic area, into a single district.85  
The City then divided the rest of the Black population between two districts in 
a way that prevented their opportunity to elect a candidate of choice.86  The 
 
WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 18, at 108.  In fact, packing in the district was so 
significant that the district was overpopulated by more than 5 percent, as compared to other 
districts.  Id.; Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Jack P.F. Gramillion, Att’y 
Gen. (Aug. 20, 1971); Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights, supra note 24, at 452 (statement of Charles Cotrell, Professor, St. 
Mary’s University).  In 2006, Congress learned that the majority of Louisiana’s objections since 
1982 were to redistricting plans.  Adegbile, supra note 38, at 436–38.  Moreover, not one 
statewide plan submitted by the Louisiana legislature originally received preclearance.  See id. at 
419.  Most recently, the 2000 plan for the Louisiana House of Representatives completely 
eliminated a majority-minority district and reduced the Black population in several other districts 
in the New Orleans area even though the 2000 census indicated the Black population remained 
the same.  See id. at 446–48.  The State submitted the plan for preclearance in the District Court 
of the District of Columbia and admitted that it eliminated the district in a conscious effort to 
limit African-American voting strength in the New Orleans area and to increase electoral 
opportunities for White voters.  See id.  The State withdrew its submission only after evidence 
revealed that it did not follow its own redistricting guidelines when creating the district.  See id.; 
see also Earls, Millonzi, Seliski & Dixon, supra note 38, at 788–89. 
 81. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Att’y Gen., to Virginia G. Godfrey, Mayor, City of 
Many (Apr. 13, 1976). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993); HUNTER, supra note 24, at 
1505–06. 
 84. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, supra note 81. 
 85. Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra 
note 16, at 2082–84. 
 86. Id. at 582. 
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Attorney General objected and determined that the 1982 redistricting plan 
“appeared calculated to carve up the city’s Black voting strength among 
several districts in an unnatural and wholly unnecessary way.”87  When the city 
resubmitted its plan it retained the fragmentation identified in the 1982 plan 
and eliminated the one district that provided an opportunity to elect.88  The 
Attorney General determined that the second plan, like the first, was drafted 
without a nonracial justification “for so facially suspect a redistricting.”89 
c. Repeated Adoption of Discriminatory Measures 
Finally, some covered jurisdictions repeatedly adopted discriminatory 
structures to control the governance of certain bodies by non-minorities.  
Sumter County, South Carolina provides just one example of how some 
covered jurisdictions repeatedly enacted a variety of discriminatory second-
generation barriers.90 
Until 1967 South Carolina’s governor would appoint members to the 
Sumter County Council based on the legislative delegation’s 
recommendation.91  After litigation required that the State create a redistricting 
plan which would create opportunities for a Black state senator to control 
recommendations for gubernatorial appointments to the Sumter County 
governing body, the state legislature created a seven-member Sumter County 
Council to be elected at large.92  Sumter County held five elections under this 
new, unprecleared system before submitting it for preclearance in 1976.93  In 
1984, a court found the at-large method of election to the Sumter County 
Council violated Section 5.94  For about 15 years, elections to the Sumter 
County Council proceeded without objection, but in 1992 Sumter County 
enacted a redistricting plan drawn with the purpose of eliminating one of the 
four majority-Black districts on the seven-member council.95  The Attorney 
General interposed another objection.96 
The Sumter County Council, however, was not the only governing body in 
the Sumter area impacted by discriminatory voting changes.97  The City of 
 
 87. Id. at 612. 
 88. Id. at 613. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 56 (2006). 
 91. See Cnty. Council of Sumter Cnty. v. United States, 596 F. Supp. 35, 37 (D.D.C 1984). 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. at 39. 
 95. Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra 
note 16, at 2082–83. 
 96. Id. at 2084. 
 97. See Voting Rights Act: Hearing on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, H.R. 3112 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 591 (1983) 
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Sumter (which lies in Sumter County) proposed 57 annexations, 45 of which 
drew objections from the Attorney General.98  The Attorney General noted 
that, despite the city’s large Black population, no Black had been elected to 
city council in recent times because of racially polarized voting and the city’s 
at-large election system.99  The proposed annexations “seem[ed] calculated to 
take in only Whites while excluding predominately Black areas,” and 
“enhance[d] the ability of the White majority to exclude Blacks totally from 
participation in the governing of the city[.]”100 
B. The Continuous Nature of Voting Discrimination Through Second-
Generation Barriers 
Without a doubt, the immediate response to the requirements of the Voting 
Rights Act, which required the registration of minority voters after nearly 100 
years of disfranchisement, was the enactment of second-generation barriers.101  
Although registration rates increased after the enactment of the Voting Rights 
Act and overt acts of violence do not occur as frequently as they did in 1965, 
traditional and new responses to minority voting strength—second-generation 
barriers—continue to be used to prevent the full participation of minority 
voters.102  Moreover, the record before Congress in 2006 showed that second-
generation barriers continue to be used with the intent to discriminate.103 
 
(statement of Ed Brown, Dist. Coordinator, NAACP) (discussing voting discrimination by the 
Sumter County Board of Education). 
 98. See Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing, supra 
note 16, at 1915–16. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1916. 
 101. See, e.g, supra notes 15, 16, 18, 24, 39, 54, 55, 70, 71; see also Miss. State Chapter, 
Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1251–55, 1268 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (explaining that 
Mississippi’s dual registration requirement was enacted in the 1890s as part of the “Mississippi 
Plan” with the intent to deny Blacks the right to vote, along with Mississippi’s poll tax and 
literacy test, shortly after the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments.  The discriminatory 
consequences of the Mississippi Plan had its intended impact for nearly 100 years but in 1987 
Black voters challenged the legality of Mississippi’s dual registration system and a federal district 
court found that the dual registration requirement was enacted for a discriminatory purpose, 
continued to have a discriminatory effect, and violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); see 
also Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273 (1997) (explaining that four years after the 1987 decision in 
Operation Push v. Allain, Mississippi established its dual registration system again by requiring 
separate registration for federal and state elections and refused to seek preclearance.  Individual 
voters brought a Section 5 enforcement action, and the Court unanimously held that preclearance 
was required). 
 102. Compare supra note 38, with Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 
2504, 2525–26 (2009). 
 103. Peyton McCrary et al., The End of Preclearance as We Knew It: How the Supreme Court 
Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 275 (2006), reprinted in 
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The actual record of second-generation discrimination in the 2006 record 
of reauthorization, therefore, is much different than the characterization of the 
record by the dissent in NAMUDNO.  The dissent’s failure to acknowledge the 
existence of the extensive second-generation barriers in the record, and the use 
of such barriers since 1965, belies the argument that second-generation barriers 
are “not probative of the type of purposeful discrimination that prompted 
Congress to enact Section 5.”104  To the contrary, Congress anticipated second-
generation barriers—although it could not contemplate every form—when it 
created the Voting Rights Act, which covered all voting changes.105 
Arguments that attempt to draw a bright-line between first- and second-
generation discriminatory voting barriers move us further away from 
eliminating discrimination in voting because they ignore the existence of 
otherwise discriminatory acts.  This was not the intent of Congress in passing 
the Voting Rights Act and it is far from the requirements of the Reconstruction 
Amendments.106  Persistent discrimination, like the repetitive use of second-
generation barriers in covered jurisdictions, harms both the experience of 
minorities in the political process and democracy in general. 
V.  SECOND-GENERATION DISCRIMINATION HARMS DEMOCRACY 
Congress did not reach its decision to reauthorize Section 5 based on 
episodic or isolated incidents.107  Instead, it evaluated the persistence of 
discriminatory second-generation barriers between 1982 and 2006.108  And, as 
explained more fully above, this record of continued discrimination was 
reviewed against a historical backdrop of both first- and second-generation 
discrimination.109 
The encounter at the Edmund Pettus Bridge and the wholesale exclusion of 
minority voters from the franchise is not the only way discrimination in voting 
can persist or the only form of voting discrimination Section 5 was designed to 
address.  A careful analysis of the appropriateness of Congress’s decision to 
 
Voting Rights Act: Section 5 Preclearance Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 96, 180–81 (2006). 
 104. Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 621 (1965). 
 105. See generally Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971). 
 106. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325–26 (1966). 
 107. Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 
§§ 2(b), 2(4), 120 Stat. 577.  Contra Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 2526. 
 108. Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 
§§ 2(b), 2(4), 120 Stat. 577. 
 109. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 56 (“[D]espite previous reauthorizations, the problem of 
voting discrimination justified reauthorization.  In light of the considerable record before it, the 
Committee has a duty to maintain the protections afforded by the temporary provisions by 
reauthorizing these vital provisions.”). 
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reauthorize Section 5 in 2006, therefore, must not ignore both the historical 
context of the record in support of the 2006 reauthorization and the evidence of 
the repeated use of second-generation barriers that the 2006 record reveals.  In 
fact, even the dissent in NAMUDNO recognizes that discrimination in voting 
occurs along a continuum.110 
Discrimination in voting, whether sophisticated, subtle, or violent, is 
discrimination.111  Each form of racial discrimination is a part of the history of 
voting discrimination in the United States and each form is equally offensive to 
our democracy.  Efforts to render the use of second-generation barriers 
insignificant because it differs in form from first-generation barriers disregards 
the fact that both second and first generation barriers prevent the equal 
opportunity of minorities to participate in the political process. 
In fact, Congress learned that over sixty percent of the administrative 
decisions objecting to voting changes under Section 5 included discriminatory 
intent as a basis for the objection.112  Congress concluded that “without the 
remedies available from the VRA’s temporary provisions, the injury to 
minority citizens and their right to the electoral franchise will be 
significant.”113  The discrimination before Congress during the 2006 
reauthorization, therefore, does not evidence the end of discrimination in 
voting but a part of America’s long struggle toward a voting process free from 
discrimination. 
In reauthorizing Section 5, unlike other cases where the Court has 
overruled congressional judgment, Congress is acting to protect a fundamental 
right under authority expressly granted by the Constitution.114  When Congress 
acts to protect fundamental rights, courts have deferred to congressional 
findings of constitutional violations and should continue to do so.115 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
When Congress reauthorized Section 5 in 2006, it met its obligation to 
protect our democracy from persistent unconstitutional discrimination, an 
offense that was unresolved for far too long.116  The record in support of 
 
 110. See id. at 2521–23. 
 111. JOHN LEWIS, WALKING WITH THE WIND 315 (1998) (“A large number of White Selma 
residents were becoming embarrassed and concerned over [Sheriff Clark’s violent] actions.  They 
weren’t eager to give Black people the right to vote, but they were certain there were more 
‘civilized’ ways of keeping us off the rolls.”). 
 112. Supra note 103. 
 113. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 56 (2006). 
 114. Compare Board of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), with City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 115. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003); Lopez v. Monterey 
County, 525 U.S. 266, 284–88 (1999). 
 116. See, e.g., J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE 37–39 (1999). 
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reauthorization showed that between 1982 and 2006 second-generation barriers 
were frequently adopted to prevent minority voters from electing candidates of 
choice.  Moreover, covered jurisdictions continued to enact discriminatory 
voting changes and electoral structures with discriminatory intent.  Congress 
correctly determined that the task of eliminating repetitive and persistent 
voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions was incomplete and refused to 
abandon the promises of our democracy while this work remained undone. 
